
Qass. 
Book. 



4- 



A CHAPTER OF NATIONAL 
DISHONOR 

* 

LEANDER T. CHAMBERLAIN 

Reprinted from "The North American Review" 

and incorporated at Senator Hitchcock's request 

as a 

SENATE'S DOCUMENT 

No. 380-62 D. Congress, March 192a 



v edition by special permission from the 
"North American Review* 5 



IMF. "IJLS 2*OYEX>AX>»S» 
1815 



A CHAPTER OF NATIONAL 
DISHONOR 

By 

LEANDER T. CHAMBERLAIN 

Reprinted from "The North American Review" 

and incorporated at Senator Hitchcock's request 

as a 

SENATE'S DOCUMENT 

No. 380-62 D. Congress, March 1912 



New edition by special permission from the 
"North American Review" 



IMP. 'XAS NOVEDADES' 
ltl5 



Tn.. 



Transferred from 
Ubra*nan's Office. 

m 17 out 






A CHAPTER OF NATIONAL 
DISHONOR 



In a recent public statement ex-President 
Roosevelt declares : "It must be a matter of 
pride to every honest American proud of the 
good name of his country, that the acquisi- 
tion of the (Panama) canal in all its details 
was as free from scandal as the public acts 
of George Washington or Abraham Lincoln." 
"The interests of the American people de- 
manded that I should act exactly as I did 
act." "Every action taken was not merely 
proper, but was carried out in accordance 
with the highest, finest, and nicest standards 
of public and governmental ethics." "The 
(1903) orders to the American naval officers 
were to maintain free and uninterrupted 
transit across the Isthmus and, with that 
purpose, to prevent the landing of armed 
forces with hostile intent at any point within 
fifty miles of Panama. These orders were 



precisely such as had been issued again and 
again in preceding years, 1900, 1901 and 
1902, for instance." "Every man who at any 
state has opposed or condemned the action 
actually taken in acquiring the right to dig 
the canal has really been the opponent of 
any and every effort that could ever have 
been made to dig the canal/' "Not only was 
the course followed as regards Panama right 
in every detail and at every point, but there 
could have been no variation from this 
course except for the worse. We not only 
did what was technically justifiable, but 
what we did was demanded by every ethical 
consideration, national and international." 
"We did harm to no one, save as harm is 
done to a bandit by a policeman who deprives 
him of his chance for blackmail." "The Un- 
ited States has many honorable chapters in 
its history, but no more honorable chapter 
than that which tells of the way in which our 
right to dig the Panama Canal was secured, 
and of the manner in which the work has 
been carried out." 

In an addres previously delivered at the 
^'Charter Day" exercises of the University 
of California, Mr. Roosevelt proudly de- 
clared that the securing of that "right" was 



his personal act. As reported, he then said: 
"I am interested in the Panama Canal be- 
cause I started it. If I had followed tradi- 
tional, conservative methods, I would have 
submitted a dignified state paper of probably 
two hundred pages to Congress, and the deb- 
ate on it would have been going on yet ; but 
I took the Canal Zone and let Congress 
debate; and while the debate goes on the 
canal does also." 

And previous to that California address, 
in his famous message to Congress of Jan- 
uary 4, 1904, President Roosevelt wrote: 
"When this government submitted to Co- 
lombia the Hay-Herran treaty (January 22, 
1903), it was already settled that the canal 
should be built. The time for delay, the 
time for permitting any government of anti- 
social spirit and of imperfect development 
to bar the work was past." "I have not 
denied, nor do I wish to deny, either the vali- 
dity of the property of the general rule that 
a new State should not be recognized as in- 
dependent till it has shown its ability to 
maintain its independence." "But like the 
principle from which it is deduced, the rule 
is subject to exceptions ; and there are in my 
opinion clear and imperative reasons why a 



departure f r6m it was justified arid even re- 
quired in the present instance. These rea- 
sons embrace, first, our treaty rights ; second, 
our national interest and safety; and third, 
the interests of collective ciivlization." "The 
United States in intervening, with or with- 
out Colombia's consent, for protection of the 
transit, has disclaimed any duty to defend 
the Colombian Government against domestic 
insurrection or against the erection of an 
independent government on the Isthmus of 
Panama." "That our position as the man- 
datary of civilization has been by no means 
misconceived is shown by the promptitude 
with which the Powers have, one after an- 
other, followed our lead in recognizing Pa- 
nama as an independent state." 

It will be more than worth while to exam- 
ine in the light of ethical principle and 
international law, of recorded fact and di- 
plomatic precedent, of national honor and 
treaty pledge, these several statements in 
which personal boasting, sweeping assertion, 
and a perfervid invoking of high morality 
are so interwoven. To present individual 
character in its due disclosure will be some- 
thing; but to see to it that history is not be- 



lied, and that the requirements of justice are 
travestied, will be far more. 

Certain fundamental considerations must 
be taken into account in any worthy discus- 
sion of the conduct of governments. First, 
that diplomacy now stands committed to 
"the extendig of the empire of law and the 
strengthening of an appreciation of public 
justice." Second, that "international juris- 
prudence is based on the moral law and em- 
bodies the consensus of civilized peoples with 
regard to their reciprocal rights and duties." 
Third, that "all nations stand on an equality 
of rights — the old and the new, the large and 
the small, monarchies and republics." It is, 
accordingly, in view of these considerations, 
that the Panama imbroglio of 1903 is to be 
judged. 

As one of the parties to that imbroglio 
was the United States of Colombia (former- 
ly New Granada), there is needed a brief 
statement of Colombia's history. The United 
States of Colombia, afterward the Republic 
of Colombia, was fully established in 1863. 
Her constitution was patterned on that of 
the United States of America. Her area, 
previous to the dismemberment of 1903, was 
hardly less than 500,000 square miles, or 



more than twice the area of Spain and Por- 
tugal combined. Her population was at 
least 4,000,000, or approximately twice that 
of Norway. Bordering on both the Atlantic 
Ocean and the Pacific, her coast line was 
more than a thousand miles, bountifully 
provided with convenient bays and excel- 
lent harbors. Extensive and varied mineral 
products were elements in her material 
wealth. But the rarest of her properties, the 
gem of her domain, was the province of Pa- 
nama, northernmost of her possessions, at 
the extreme north of the southern continent. 
Included in that province was the Isthmus 
of Panama, narrowest barrier between two 
oceans. As the American continents were 
discovered in the search for a westward pas- 
sage from Europe to Asia, so, through the 
centuries subsequent to that discovery, the 
Isthmus of Panama was regarded as the 
likeliest route for an inter-oceanic canal. 

In 1855 an Isthmian railroad was com- 
pleted along a course substantially the same 
as must be taken by a waterway. In 1881 a 
French company undertook the construction 
of a canal, both railroad and canal having 
been neutralized. The original construction 
company failed and a "New Panama Com- 



pany" was formed to take over the existing 
canal rights and obligations, and to complete 
the undertaking. But the new company also 
proved unequal to the task; and as early as 
1897 it was realized that no private resources 
would be adequate, and that no government 
save that of the United States was wholly 
competent. It was understood that the 
United States was willing to proceed upon 
certain conditions. 

But meantime, even antedating the estab- 
lishing of the United States of Colombia, a 
treaty had been entered into between the 
United States of America and the govern- 
ment of that same country, to wit : the Rep- 
ublic of New Granada. It was entitled "A 
treaty of peace, amity, navigation, and Com- 
merce." It was negociated by the respective 
administrations on December 12, 1846, and 
was ratified and proclaimed in June, 1848. 
The preamble reads: 

"The United States of North America and the Republic 
of New Granada in South America, desiring to make 
lasting and firm the friendship and good understanding 
which happily exist between both nations, have resolved 
to fix in a manner clear, distinct, and positive the rules 
which shall in the future be religiously observed between 



10 



each other, by means of a treaty or general convention of 
peace and friendship, commerce and navigation. 



"Article I. There shall be a perfect, firm, and inviol- 
able peace and sincere friendship between the United 
States of America and the Republic of New Granada in 
all the extent of their possessions and territories, and be- 
tween their citizens respectiviley without distinction of 
person or places. 



"Article XXXV. The United States of America and 
the Republic of New Granada, desiring to make as endur- 
able as possible the relations which are to be established 
between the two parties by virtue of this treaty, have 
declared solemnly and do agree to the following 
points : 

"First. 



"In order to secure to themselves the tranquil and 
constant enjoyment of these advantages, and as an especial 
compensation for the said advantages and for the favors 
they have acquired by Articles IV., V., and VI. of this 
treaty (articles which secure to the United States 
reciprocal privileges of importation and tonnage dues, and 
equal customs duties), the United States guarantee pos- 
itively and efficaciously to New Granada, by the present 
stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the before-mentioned 
Isthmus, with the view that the free transit from the one 
to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed 



II 

in a future time while this treaty exists; and in cons- 
equence the United States also guarantee in the same 
manner the rights of sovereignty and property which New 
Granada has and possesses over the said territory. 

"Second. The present treaty shall remain in full force 
and vigor for the term of twenty years from the day of 
the exchange of ratifications. 



"Third. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if neither 
-party notifies to the other its intention of reforming any 
of or all the articles of this treaty twelve months before 
the expiration of the tyenty years specified above, the said 
treaty shall continue binding on both parties beyond the 
said twenty years, until twelve months from the time that 
one of the parties notifies its intention of proceeding to a 
reform. 



"Sixth. Any special or remarkable advantages that the 
one or the other power may enjoy from the foregoing 
stipulations are and ought to be always understood in 
virtue and in compensation of the obligations they have 
just contracted, and which have been specified in the first 
number of this article." 

Such is the solemn traty of 1846; a treaty 
"to make lasting and firm the friedship and 
good understanding which happily exist be- 
tween the United States and New Granada" 
(now Colombia), whose stipulations were to 



12 



be "religiously observed"; a treaty decreeing 
"a perfect, firm, and inviolable peace and sin- 
cere friendship" between the two nations; 
a treaty in which, as compensation for spe- 
cified "advantages and favours", the United 
States "positively and efficaciously" guar- 
anteed to New Granada "the perfect neutral- 
ity of the Isthmus" and, in the same manner, 
"the rights of sovereignty which New Gra- 
nada has and possesses over the said terri- 
tory" ; a treaty terminable on twelve-months' 
notice. The practical interpretation and ap- 
plication of the treaty are plain. 

Under date of February 10, 1847, on ty 
two months of ter the initiation of the treaty, 
President Polk, in a special message to the 
Senate, said: 

"There does not appear any other effectual means of 
securing to all nations the advantages of this important 
passage, but the guarantee of great commercial powers 
that the Isthmus shall be neutral territory. . . . 

"The guarantee of the sovereignty of New Granada 
over the Isthmus is a natural consequence of this neutral- 
ity. . . . New Granada would not yield this province 
that it might become a neutral State ; and if she should, it 
is not sufficiently populous or wealthy to establish or 
maintain an independent severeignty. But a civil govern- 



13 

ment must exist there to protect the works which shall be 
constructed. New Granada is not a power which will ex- 
cite the jealously of any nation." 

The neutrality guaranteed to New Gra- 
nada undoubtedly referred to foreign na- 
tions only. It was against interference by 
an outside government, interference which 
might, among other evil results, interrupt 
the transit from the one to the other sea. 
Similarly the guarantee of New Granada's 
"rights of sovereignity and property" was 
with primray reference to an invasion by a 
foreign power, which might imperil the Isth- 
mian transit. And since the paramount is- 
sue in the case of both the neutrality and 
sovereignty which the United States guar- 
anteed was the safeguarding of the transit, 
there was a valid implication that the United 
States, on due occasion and especially at 
New Granada's request, would give aid 
against transit interference from any source 
whatever, whether foreign or domestic. 

The direct authority, however, to be cited 
by the United States as warrant for the aid 
actually given to New Granada (now Co- 
lombia) in the maintenance of free Isthmian 
transit, as also the clear ground of the duty 



14 

of the United States to render such aid, is in 
the fact that by the treaty of 1846 New Gra- 
nada distinctly pledged herself to keep the 
said transit inviolate for the free use of 
the goverment and citizens of the United 
States. 

"The government of New Granada guarantees to the 
government of the United States that the right of way or 
transit across the Isthmus of Panama upon any modes of 
transportation which now exist, or that may be hereafter 
constructed, shall be open and free to the government and 
citizens of the United States, and for the transportation of 
any articles of lawful commerce belonging to the citizens 
of the United States." 

That guarantee by New Granada, in a 
treaty of "peace, amity, navigation and com- 
merce," a treaty "to make lasting and firm 
the friendship and good understanding" of 
the two nations, established a relation be- 
tween the United States and New Granada, 
in which mutual aid became not only right- 
ful, but also assured. Henceforth it was to 
be implicity relied upon that if the weaker 
nation was temporarily incapable of a perfect 
fulfilment of its guarantee, the stronger na- 
tion would, upon request, lend assistance. 
In New Granada's guarantee, acknowledged 
by the United States as an "advantage and 



i5 

favor" received, is the original and sufficing 
basis for the right and obligation of helpful 
interference by the United States, in the 
emergency of transit interruption. A cor- 
roborative, complementary basis also exists 
in the avowed motive and purpose of the 
counter guarantee by the United States of 
New Granada's neutrality and sovereignty 
— "with the view that the free transit from 
the one to the other sea may not be inter- 
rupted or embarrassed in a future time while 
this treaty exists." Yet the prime basis lies 
in New Granada's pledge which the United 
States gratefully accepted. 

But beyond the bounds of such reciprocal 
right and obligation the United States might 
not go. In emergencies other than the dis- 
turbance of interoceanic transit, or peril to 
the persons and possessions of Americans, 
there might be no intervention in the affairs 
of New Granada (now Colombia). By the 
law of nations and the terms of the treaty 
itself, Colombia, as the successor of New 
Granada, was the sovereign peer of the 
United States. Save for the main purpose 
of protecting free transit and thus safe- 
guarding her own interests in such transit, 
the United States might no more land her 



i6 



forces on Colombia's soil, or even threaten 
such landing, than she might land her forces, 
or threaten to land them, on the soil of Rusia 
or Japan. 

Nor is even this the full measure of the 
restraint which the Executive of the United 
States was bound to recognize and respect. 
It has been conceded that the guaranteed 
neutrality and sovereignty had reference to 
foreign powers. But it is to be borne in 
mind that in guaranteeing Colombia's neu- 
trality and sovereignty as against foreign 
powers, the United States distinctly decreed 
and surpassingly emphasized her own ex- 
clusion from acts of invasion. She determ- 
inately erected an impassable barrier against 
her own interference with Colombia's inde- 
pendent authority. And this, in the simple 
fact that she herself was a "foreign nation" ! 
The treaty inhibition affected her, first of 
all. She virtually named herself in the guar- 
ante; and the guarantor, being thus in- 
cluded in the inhibition, was, beyond all 
others, forbidden to violate its terms. Other- 
wise it were as if the guardian of a dependent 
child should record his oath and give his 
bond to defend his charge against all unlaw- 
ful acts, and then should himself expropriate 



his ward's possessions and assume dictator- 
ial control. It were as if an officer of the law 
sworn to uphold the citizen's rights, and to 
lay violent hands on no man save by statu- 
tory warrant and command, should want- 
only assail the helpless and ruthlessly strike 
down the unoffending. Being a nation for- 
eign to Colombia, the United States, in her 
"positive and efficacious" guarantee, freely 
placed herself under supreme restraint. 

With the civil wars of Colombia the United 
States had no concern, save as they harm- 
fully affected the persons or possessions of 
American citizens, or interrupted or endan- 
gered Isthmian transit and traffic. Yet on 
November 6, 1903, Colombia was informed 
that 

"The President holds that he is bound to see that the 
peaceable traffic of the world across the Isthmus of Pa- 
nama shall not longer be disturbed by a constant succession 
of unnecessary and wasteful civil wars." 

The official records are open. Those re- 
cords will either uphold the Presidential 
assertion or they will prove it to be wild and 
inexcusable. Let it be seen to what extent 
from the establishing of the United States 



i8 



of Colombia in 1863 to the Panama im- 
broglio of 1903, Isthmian transit was so dis- 
turbed that the interference of the United 
was required ! 

In March, 1865, our Panama consul was 
apprehensive of harm from local lawlessness, 
and a few marines guarded the consul and 
other citizens for thirteen hours. In May, 
1873, a small force of marines and sailors 
protected the persons and property of Amer- 
ican citizens in Panama for fifteen days. In 
September of the same year, a similar service 
was rendered for sixteen days. In January, 
1885, twelve marines guarded property in 
Colon for thirteen and one-half hours. Later 
in the same year, Isthmian transit was ser- 
iously interrupted and forces were landed, 
for fifty-six days. Toward the close of 1901, 
protection of transit was required for four- 
teen days. In the autumn of 1902 transit 
was guarded for sixty-two days. 

Thus during full forty years, United 
States forces were employed in only seven 
instances and for a total period of 164 days. 
In each case the forces were employed with 
Colombia's approval. In no case was there 
fighting, the mere precautionary measures 
being sufficient. In no case did the force 



19 

exceed 824 men. Moreover, in four out of 
the seven instances there was no "interrup- 
tion of transit," only an apprehension of peril 
to persons and property. In fine, Isthmian 
transit was interrupted in only three in- 
stances in the forty years of Colombia's his- 
tory, and for only 132 days! 

Yet the President officially represented 
that Isthmian transit had been disturbed al- 
most incessantly for many years; that inter- 
ruption was the chronic condition. A con- 
stant disturbing cause bringing about a 
virtually constant disturbance ! In the com- 
parison, the increase of FalstafFs men in 
buckram — "eleven grown out of two" — was 
accuracy itself: three reduplicated into an 
implied constant succession! What of the 
author of such assertion? It would appear 
that he then took for his motto, Throw mud 
vigorously, some of it will stick — "Asperg« 
fortiter, aliquid adhaerebit." That was on 
November 6, 1903. 

Meantime, on June 25, 1902, the President 
gave his approval to the Act commonly call- 
ed the "Spooner Act," looking toward the 
construction of an Isthmian canal. That act 
embodied the decision of the United States 
in favour of the Panama route. It authorized 



20 



the President to acquire, if possible, at a cost 
not to exceed a certain sum, "the rights, pri- 
vileges, frachises, concessions," and all other 
assets of the "New Panama Company" ; and 
to obtain from Colombia on such terms as 
he considered to be fair, perpetual control 
(not cession) for canal purposes of a strip 
of land from ocean to ocean not less than 
six miles wide,, such control to include the 
emergent defense of the canal, the institut- 
ing of needful legal tribunals, and the mak- 
ing and enforcing of the requisite police and 
sanitary regulations. The act also provided 
that if, from the Canal Company and the 
Colombian Government, the President was 
unable to obtain satisfactory terms within 
a reasonable time, the route known as the 
"Nicaragua Route" should be adopted. 

After the passage of the "Spooner Act," 
the Colombian Administration — not Colom- 
bian in propria persona, but only the Colom- 
bian Administration — initiated negotiations 
in favor and furtherance of the Panama 
route. Those negotiations led, on January 
22, 1903, to the well-known "Hay-Herran 
Convention." In that convention Colombia, 
was to give to the United States jurisdiction 
over the desired strip of land, and to concede 



21 



the right to construct and operate a canal 
for a period of one hundred years, renewable 
at the option of the United States for periods 
of a similar duration. The convention re- 
affirmed Article XXXV of the treaty of 1846,. 
and explicitly provided that only in excep- 
tional circumstances, on account of unfor- 
seen or imminent danger to the canal, rail- 
ways, or other works, or to the lives and 
property of the persons engaged upon them, 
should the United States employ its armed 
forces, without previously obtaining the 
consent of Colombia; and that as soon as 
sufficient Colombian forces should arrive, 
those of the United States should be with- 
drawn. But the Hay-Herran convention be- 
ing simply an agreement between the re- 
spective administrations, was necessarily 
dependent for its vital force upon its ratifica- 
tion by the respective Senates. It was ex- 
pressly stipulated that 

"The convention, when signed by the contracting 
parties, shall be ratified in conformity with the laws of the 
respective countries." 

The Washington Administration has 
urged that any two governments, in initiat- 
ing a treaty, "bind themselves, pending its 



22 



ratification, not only not to oppose its con- 
summation, but also to do nothing in con- 
travention of its terms. ,, That is true of 
governments in the limited sense of the 
Executive, the Administration, but it does 
not apply to the attitude and act of a nation's , 
congress ; and in the final event the ratifying 
power is to proceed in accordance with its 
own reasoning and conviction, no matter 
what administrations may have stipulated or 
done. Furthermore, as the Canal Company 
could, in no case, tranfer its rights and pos- 
sessions, without the consent of Colombia, 
the first article of the Hay-Herran conven- 
tion provides: 

"The government of Colombia authorizes the New- 
Panama Canal Company to sell and transfer to the United 
States its rights, privileges, properties, and concessions 
as well as the Panama Railroad and all the shares or parts 
of the shares of that company." 

Of couse, that and the other provisions of 
the administrational agreement were to 
came before the Colombian Senate for con- 
sideration; and that Senate, like any other 
independent legislature, was bound to take 
full cognizance of the matter, and freely dis- 



23 

cuss all offered amendmnets. Yet even be- 
fore the Colombian Senate convened, the 
American minister to Colombia, on April 24, 
1903, addressed the following note to the 
Colombian Minister of Foreign Relations: 

"I am directed to inform your Excellency, if the point 
should be raised, that everything relative to this matter 
is included in the convention recently signed between Co- 
lombia and the United States, and that, furthermore, any 
modification would be violative of the 'Spooner Act' and 
therefore inadmissible." 

Again, and still in advance of the session 
of the Colombian Senate, the Minister of 
Foreign Relations was advised that 

"If Colombia should noy reject the treaty or unduly 
delay its ratification, the friendly feeling between the two 
countries would be so seriously compromised that action 
might be taken by the Congress next winter which every 
friend of Colombia would regret." 

And after the Colombian Senate was in 
session, on August 5, 1903, further warning 
was sent through the Colombian Minister of 
Foreign Relations, to the effect that appar- 
ently the force of the notes of April 24th and 
June 13th had not been duly appreciated as 



24 



"the final expression of the opinion or in- 
tention" of the Washington Government. 
The warning proceeded: 

"If Colombia desires to maintain the friendly relations 
which at present exist between the two countries, and at 
the same time to secure for herself the extraordinary ad- 
vantages that are to be produced for her, .... the 
present treaty will have to be ratified exactly in its present 
form, without amendment whatsoever." 

Yet the Hay-Herran instrument itself pro- 
vided that "The convention, when signed by 
the contracting parties, shall be ratified in 
conformity with the laws of the respective 
countries." Assuredly! Else the mere Exe- 
cutive, the mere Administration, would have 
full and final authority in matters involving 
the nation's vital interests — to a fatal usur- 
pation of the power of Congress. The Sen- 
ate of the United States has again amend- 
ed, and rejected, treaties which had been 
duly negociated by the Administration. Still 
the Washington Administration, peremp- 
torily forbade Colombia's Senate either to 
amend or reject! 

Was this attempted coercion "not only 
technically justifiable, but demanded by 
every ethical consideration national and in- 



25 

tei-national" ? Was it "as free from scandal 
as the public acts of George Washington and 
Abraham Lincoln , ' ? In utmost soberness of 
inquiry, did any civilized representative of 
superior power ever indulge in browbeating 
so pitiable and so pitiless? Can such coward- 
ly disrespect be matched in the annals of 
treatymaking nations? And that, on the 
part of the Executive of a great republic 
which professed to do justice and to love 
mercy, and against a nation helpless, yet 
standing in a relation of acknowledged 
equality of sovereignty and independence! 
A nation at whose hands we had confessed- 
ly received important "advantages and fa- 
vors" ! A nation to which we were bound by 
an inviolable treaty of "peace and amity," 
of "friedship and good understanding"; a 
treaty whose stipulations were to be "reli- 
giously observed"! That nation coolly in- 
formed that if, in the exercise of her indis- 
putable prerrogative, she followed what 
might be her patriotic judgment, she should 
suffer a retribution whereat the ears of them 
that heard should tingle ! 

What must be the character and culture of 
the President who proudly affirms that such 
was his highest conception of what was "de- 



26 



manded by every ethical consideration/' and 
should be "a matter of pride to every honest 
American"? 

After long and vehement debate and post- 
ponement to an extra session, the American 
Senate, on March 17, 1903, ratified the treaty. 
After long and earnest debate, the Colom- 
bian Senate, on August 12, 1903, despite the 
President's unveiled threat, refused ratifica- 
tion, and adjourned on October 31st. 

It is to be distinctly observed at this point 
that, while there was no stipulation for the 
absolute cession to the United States of the 
Canal Zone, there was to be perpetual occu- 
pancy and jurisdiction — periods of one hun- 
dred years, with the option of renewal by the 
United States, but no opiton of rejection by 
Colombia — the construction of vast and per- 
manent works, the right to safeguard those 
works, along with police and sanitary con- 
trol. The constitutional authorities in the 
Colombian Senate held that such a grant, 
although less than absolute cession, was 
contrary to the nation's organic law. They 
regarded it as, so far forth, a surrender of 
national sovereignty, notwithstanding the 
statement that "the United States freely 
acknowledges and recognizes this soverign- 



27 

ty (of Colombia) and disavows any intention 
to impair it in any way whatever." Would 
the constitutional authorities in the Senate 
of the United States be likely to hold other- 
wise in case it was proposed to grant to a 
foreign power a similarly endless occupancy 
and jurisdiction of a part of our national 
domain? Would they admit that their dis- 
cussion of that issue might fairly be regarded 
as factious and deceitful? Yet, as has been 
pointed out, it was proposed in the delibera- 
tions of the Colombian Senate so to amend 
the constitution that the apprehended legal 
objection should be removed! 

As for the consideration which prompted 
the adverse action of the Colombian Senate,, 
it may be said that in any case they were 
properly beyond our official animadversion 
or even official discussion. High-minded 
diplomacy usually holds in courteous respect 
the motives which may have inspired the 
legislative act of a sovereign nation. Yet in 
addressing Colombia our Administration 
ascribed to her the basest of motives. The 
mere opinion of our minister to Colombia 
was cited as showing that the Senate's dis- 
cussions were prolonged, and the ratification* 
finally rejected, with the sordid view of hold- 



28 

ing up the construction of an Isthmian 
waterway, and thus being the better able to 
-exact terms from the United States. Further, 
what was only a report of the Colombian 
Senate's "Committee on the Panama Canal" 
was officially quoted as proof of that accus- 
atory opinion. The following statement 
was published in a rejoinder to Colombia's 
Minister Plenipotentiary in Washington* 

"By a report of the majority of the Panama Canal 
Committee, read in the Colombian Senate on the 14th of 
October last, it was recommended that the bill which had 
•been introduced to authorize the government to enter upon 
new negotiations should be indefinitely postponed. The 
reason for this recommendation is disclosed in the same 
report. ... By a treaty concluded Aprils 1893, the 
•original concession to the Panama Canal Company was 
extended until December 31, 1904. The report (of the 
Colombian Senate's Committee) affirms that the aspect 
of the question would be entirely changed in consequence 
of the fact that when a year later the Colombian Congress 
should meet in ordinary session, the extension of 1893 
would have expired and every concession with it. In that 
case . . . the Republic would become the possessor or 
owner, without any need of a previous judicial decision 
and without any indemnity, of the canal itself and of the 
adjuncts which belong to it; and would not only be able 
to contract without any impediments, but would be in 
more clear, more definite, and more advantageous 
possession both legally and materially." 



29 

The Administration's official statement 
continues : 

"This programme, if not expressly, was at least tacitly 
adopted by the Colombian Congress. ... It was a 
scheme to which this government could not possibly be- 
come a party." 

And that, although the Golombian Senate 
was a national legislature and had acted 
withing its sovereingn rights! 

Is it conceivable that the President would 
have cast such innuendoes and accusations 
in the face of Great Britain or Germany or 
France ? Would he have tolerate such open 
affront on the part of any other nation? To 
ask the questions is to answer them. The 
physical weakness of Colombia should have 
been her triple protection. Toward helpless- 
ness power should have felt itself bound by 
a chivalrous noblesse oblige. It is safe to 
say that never in the previous history of 
civilised diplomacy was there such a public, 
official characterisation by one nation of 
another nation's motives for legislative ac- 
tion. Therein the President's conduct was 
audaciously wrong. 

At this point the President vainly seeks 



3° 

his vindication by a reference to practical 
results. He says: 

"Be it remembered that unless I had acted exactly as I 
did act, there would now be no Panama Canal. .'".•: . 
Every man who at any stage has opposed or condemned 
the action actually taken in acquiring the right to dig the 
canal has really been the opponent of any and every effort 
that could ever have been made to dig the canal." 

Here is a veritable "Daniel come to judg- 
ment"! The great Burke professed his in- 
ability to draw a valid indictment against 
the people of a whole nation; but this self- 
eulogizer finds no difficulty in denouncing 
the innumerable critics of his Panama action 
under the one base category of those wishing 
to deprive the world for ever of a waterway 
from the one to the other sea! No matter 
how many the dissidents, nor how worthy 
their reputation and achievements, nor how 
earnestly explicit their declaration that they 
yielded to none in their desire for inter- 
oceanic navigation, they are charged with 
hostility to any Panama Canal whatever ! 

How insensate the President's charge! 
As of those who were confident that Colom- 
bia would appreciate decent treatment, and 
would agree to amended but still reasonable 



3i 



terms, were thus confident without a ve- 
stige of reason! He himself had already 
declared: 



"Colombia, after having rejected the treaty in spite of 
our protests and warning when it was in her power to 
accept it, has since shown the utmost eagerness to accept 
the same treaty if only the status quo could be restored." 



He had furthermore, and for his own 
purposes, quoted a Colombian high official 
as affirming, on November 6, 1903 — the 
very day on which the Panama insurgents 
were recognised as having established a new 
nation — in a note to the American minister 
at Bogota, that on certain conditions 



"The Colombian government will declare martial law 
and, by virtue of vested constitutional authority when 
public order is disturbed, will approve by decree the ratifi- 
cation of the canal treaty as signed ; or, if the government 
of the the United States prefers, will call extra session of 
Congress with new and friendly members next May, to 
approve the treaty." 



The American minister at Bogota adds, 
"There is a great reaction in favour of the 
treaty." On January 6, 1904, Colombia's 



32 

Minister Plenipotentiary at Washington of- 
ficially declared: 

"The necessity of the canal is so well recognised in 
Colombia that it was proposed in the discussion in the 
Senate to amend the Constitution in orther to remove 
( what Colombia regarded as ) the constitutional 
difficulties; and the Minister of Foreign Relations, after 
the sessions of Congress were closed, directed the charge 
d'affaires to advise the Washington government that the 
government of Colombia was ready to enter into renewed 
negotiations for a canal convention." 

He further averred that the fact of the 
rejection of the Hay-Herran convention 

"does not mean that we have been opposed, nor that we 
are opposed, to the realization of the greatest undertaking 
of the kind which the past and future centuries have seen 
or will see. ... I have been directed to declared to your 
government that Colombia, earnestly wishing that work 
of the canal be carried into effect, not only because it 
suits her interests, but also that of the commerce of the 
world, is disposed to enter into arrangements that would 
secure for the United States the execution and owner- 
ship of the said work. . . . The charge made against the 
government of Colombia that it proposes to cancel the 
concession of the French Company vanishes as soon as it 
is known that under the latest concession granted by 
Colombia the said concession would not lapse until the 
year 1910." 



Who can doubt that, if the President had 
curbed his angry impatience, and withheld 
his irritating, insolent threats, Colombia's 
Senate would have acceded to terms rightly 
advantageous to both countries? Who dis- 
believes that, if, as was our acknowledged, 
perfect right, we had invoked the third 
"point", of Article XXXV of the treaty of 
1846 — to wit, 

"The said treaty shall be binding on both parties until 
twelve month from the time that one of the parties notifies 
its intention of proceeding to a reform" — 

Colombia would have been duly impressed 
with the gravity of her situation, and have 
earnestly striven to come to terms with her 
indispensable ally? Accordingly it is pure 
hardihood for the President to affirm, "Un- 
less I had acted exactly as I did act, there 
would now be no canal." It is simple sland- 
er, silly slander, when he says, "Every man 
who at any stage has opposed or condemned 
the action actually taken in acquiring the 
right to dig the canal has really been the 
opponent of any and every effort that could 
ever have been made to dig the canal." His 
critics asked that the right to dig the canal 



34 

might be acquired by lawful means. Being 
enthusiastically in favor of an interoceanic 
waterway, they only demanded that "a de- 
cent respect for the opinion of mankind," a 
substantial regard for international law and 
treaty obligations, should guide the acts of 
the Washington Administration. It certain- 
ly is not too much to suppose that if their 
protests had been heeded, we should now 
have a canal whose title would be wholly 
free from stain, and whose advantages might 
be enjoyed with complete self-respect. 

In this chapter of national dishonor there 
are still other transactions to be considered. 

The President, according to his published 
admission, was aware as early as August, 
1903, that the secession of the Province of 
Panama was secretly fomented. He has 
openly declared that, toward the end of Oc- 
tober, the attempt "appeared to be an im- 
minent probability." In his message to 
Congress, of January 4, 1904, he said: 

"In view of these facts I directed the Navy Department 
to issue instructions such as would insure our having ships 
within easy reach of the Isthmus, in the event of need 
arising. . . . On November 2nd the following instruction 
were sent to the commanders of the Boston, Nashville, and 
Dixie: 'Maintain free and uninterrupted transit 



35 

Prevent landing of any armed force, either government or 
insurgent, within fifty miles of Panama." 

- That is, in time of profound peace between 
Colombia and the United States; while the 
treaty of "peace and amity," of "friedship 
and good understanding/' was in undisturb- 
ed force; while it was still written, "There 
shall be a perfect, firm, and inviolable peace 
and sincere friendship" ; while the neutrality 
and sovereignty of Colombia were solemnly 
and gratefully guaranteed by the United 
Stated as against interference by foreign 
powers, and therefore against interference 
by the United States herself; while Isthmian 
transit was absolutely free from interrup- 
tion ; while there was no slightest overt act 
on the part of the would-be seceders; and 
while Colombia's acquiescence had not been 
so much as requested, Colombia was force- 
fully forbidden to land her own troops with- 
in fifty miles' of the city of Panama, where, 
if anywhere, the secession would be at- 
tempted ! In other words, the success of the 
revolt, whenever it might occur, was resist- 
lessly decreed. When the President of the 
United States issued the "fifty mile order" 
of November 2, 1903, he virtually declared 



36 

war against the very nation of which the 
United States was the sworn ally, and to 
which the United States was united by ob- 
ligations admittedly paramount. He bound 
Colombia hand and foot and delivered her 
over to her domestic foes. 

Yet the President, in his floundering at- 
tempts at self-defence, declares that 

"These orders were precisely such as had been issued 
again and again in preceding years — 1900, 1901, and 1902 
for instance." 

But no identity, nor even resemblance, ap- 
pears when the orders of those preceding 
years are brought into comparison. Here is 
the record. On July 25, 1900, our Consul at 
Panama was thus instructed: 

"You are directed to protest against any act of hostility 
which may involve or imperil the safe and peaceful transit 
of persons or property across the Isthmus of Panama. 
The bombardment of Panama would have this effect, and 
the United States must insist upon the neutrality of the 
Isthmus as guaranteed by the treaty." 

Here was simply a protest in advance of 
possible harm. It was merely a warning of 
Colombia that she would pursue a certain 



37 

course upon her own responsibility, and that 
the United States would interfere if free 
transit was interrupted. On November 20, 
1901, this telegram was sent to our Panama 
consul : 



"Notify all parties molesting or interfering- with free 
transit across the Isthmus that such interference must 
cease, and that the United States will prevent the interrup- 
tion of traffic upon the railroad. Consult with captain of 
the Iowa, who will be instructed to land marines if neces- 
sary for the protection of the railroad in accordance with 
the treaty rights and obligations of the United States." 



That order went no further than to demand 
that interruption of transit should cease, and 
to provide means, in case of necessity, for 
enforcing the demand. On September 12, 
1902, the commander of the Ranger, then at 
Panama, was notified: 



"The United States guarantees perfect neutrality of 
Isthmus, and that a free transit from sea to sea be not 
interrupted or embarrassed. . . . Any transportation of 
troops which might contravene these provision of treaty 
should not be sanctioned by you, nor should use of road 
be permitted which might convert the line of transit into 
theatre of hostility." 



38 

Here, again, was a merely admonitory order, 
sent to forestall any use of the transit line 
which would destroy its legitimate function 
by making it, unnecessarily, the scene of 
armed conflict. 

Thus the official record shows that, so far 
from countenancing the "fifty-mile order," 
the asserted precedents clearly condemned 
it. In direct refutation of the President's 
declaration is the fact that the "previous 
orders were: first, in accordance with Co- 
lombia's understanding and wish; second, 
that they sought, in authorised ways, to safe- 
guard Isthmian transit from critically im- 
pending or actual interruption; third, that 
they constituted no assault upon either the 
supreme jurisdiction or the supremely free 
action of Colombia. The "fifty-mile order" 
grossly offended in all these respects. It was 
known to be infinitely abhorrent to Colom- 
bia as a sovereign nation; it had prime refer- 
ence to an apprehended political insurrection 
against Colombia's territorial integrity and 
national control, with only consequential 
reference to a possible transit interruption; 
it laid essentially violent hands on Colom- 
bia's sovereignty; it forcibly prevented Co- 
lombia from taking precautionary measures; 



39 

it was a virtual declaration of war. Colom- 
bia was suddenly, peremtorily restrained 
from the free disposition of her own troops 
on her own soil. The venerable treaty whose 
stipulations were to be religiously observed 
was, so far forth, flung aside as vacuous and 
its covenants trampled in the dust! 

The President's search for justifying pre- 
cedents was foredoomed to failure. There 
was a vast improbability that the history of 
the United States would furninsh any ana- 
logy of such despotism. The President 
should have known beforehand — doubless 
he did know — that the outrage was wholly 
novel, conspicuous in its infamous isolation. 
An unoffending ally fettered and gyved, in 
forecast of her instinctive movement for self- 
preservation ! The President's act was truly 
monumental. It was altogether and charac- 
teristically his own. 

Imagine that when the Confederate forces 
threatened Washington, a nation whose 
strength outmeasured ou.s as ours outmea- 
sured Colombia's had forbidden our Govern- 
ment to send troops within fifty miles of the 
endangered capital. Imagine that the dict- 
ating nation was bound to us by treaty 
pledges of "inviolable peace and sincere 



4 o 

friendship." Imagine that our Government 
had guaranteed that nation, to the effect that 
its legation in Washington should" not be 
imperiled. Yet that when we thought to 
safeguard the capital from secession's deadly- 
attack — all legations being then unmolested, 
and it being by no means sure that, even if 
there was armed conflict, any legation would 
be injured — our overawing ally forcibly pre- 
vented our proposed defensive action, thus 
handing us over to our assailants; mak- 
ing our disruption a certainty foregone and 
absolute! What, in that case, would have 
been our feeling and judgment? What would 
have been the verdict of the civilized world? 
Would it have been conceded by us, or by 
anybody, that the interdict was other than 
atrocious ? On the very face of it, and in its 
very nature, the peremptory ban would ap- 
pear as unspeakablly abusive. 

But the President tells us that he then 
knew, and now knows, no standard of public 
and governmental ethics "higher, or finer, or 
nicer" ! Perhaps he is entitled to the plea. 

The "fifty-mile order," however, was des- 
tined to be outdone. On the succeeding day, 
November 3, 1903, the following order was 



4i 

sent to the commander of the Nashville at 
Colon: 

"In the interests of peace make every effort to prevent 
government troops at Colon from proceeding to Panama. 
The transit of the Isthmus must be kept open and order 

maintained." 

The President's repressive determination 
was not to be balked. As yet, our Panama 
consul had forwarded only the news of what 
he called an "uprising" in that one city ! Yet 
the President issued and order preventing 
Colombia from moving her own troops, via 
her own railway, from her own Colon to her 
own Panama! So far as concerned their 
freedom to go to the scene of danger, Co- 
lombia's troops were reconcentradoed and 
manacled ! Let is still be borne in mind that 
there was no interruption of transit by either 
loyalist or insurgent. Let it be taken into 
account that the President, himself, under 
the pretense of maintaining peace and order 
when peace and order perfectly prevailed, 
violently interrupted free transit, absolutely 
closing it to the forces of sovereign Co- 
lombia, a treaty-bound ally of the United 
States ! 



42 

In self-exculpation, the President has de- 
clared that 

"The theory that the treaty obliged the government of 
the United States to protect Colombia againts domestic 
insurrection or its consequences finds no support in the 
record, and is in its nature inadmissible." 

Well said! But, conversely, the treaty did 
obligate the Government of the United 
States not to take sides against Colombia 
in any conflict she might have with the 
agents of domestic insurrection. In both its 
letter and spirit the treaty did bind the Pres- 
ident of the United States not to predoom 
an ally to defeat in the face of attempted 
dismemberment. The treaty did make it 
inevitable that such crushing hostility should 
forever appear as gratuitous perfidy. 

What the Washington Government should 
have done, in place of the cruel "fifty- 
mile order" and the still more cruel repres- 
sion of the following day, was to respect 
Colombia's right to a perfectly free moving 
of her troops, whether overland or by sea, or 
by her Isthmian railway; at the same time 
notifying Colombia that any interruption by 
her of Isthmian transit, if not absolutely 



43 

necessary to her self-protection, would be 
prevented by American forces. But the Pres- 
ident, in a deliberate, calculating forecast of 
the Panama insurrection, joined forces with 
the seceders and conquered Colombia in the 
interest of secession. 

The true quality of the President's proce- 
dure will be the more clearly perceived 
through a moment's consideration of what, 
in such a crisis, Colombia herself might 
rightfully have done. Colombia had the in- 
disputable right to defend herself against 
disruption. In case of actual civil war or its 
perceived imminence, especially civil war in- 
volving territorial integrity, any nation may 
take such measures, within the recognized 
rules of warfare, as that nation may deem 
needful. The right of self preservation is 
elemental. It inheres not only in national 
sovereignty, but also in national existence. 
Not even treaty stipulations can be set up 
in contravention of it. Accordingly, Colom- 
bia, if threatened by secession, might herself, 
were it in the imperative interests of self- 
preservation, close Isthmian transit to all 
except her own troops. Or she might close 
it to all except herself and the United States. 
Or she might impose special condition to 



44 

which everybody using the transit must tem- 
porarily conform. In other phrase, Colom- 
bia if vitally assailed might take supreme 
control of all the resources within her do- 
main. Her inherent sovereignty, whether 
guaranteed or mot, would give her a right 
paramount to the rights of even her allies. 
In fine, in the emergency of self-preserva- 
tion, the control of Isthmian transit was co- 
pletely Colombia's. In that case, the Pres- 
ident of the United States was authorized 
to do no more than see to it that Colombia's 
interruption, or closure, of transit was 
neither wantonly imposed nor unreasonably 
prolonged. Onjy on proof os such wanton- 
ness or unreasonableness would there be just 
cause of offense. To hold otherwise would 
be to hold that, in our own Civil War, foreign 
nations might justly complain because our 
blockade of an insurgent coast rendered nug- 
atory, for the time being, their long standing 
right to navigate our ports and rivers. 

Let, then, the "fifty-mile order" of Novem- 
ber 2, 1903, and the still severer interdict of 
the following day be judged in the light of 
those "first principles." 

No doubt, upon the bombardment of Pa- 
nama and the threatened violence to Amer- 



45 

icans in Colon, United States troops were 
rightly landed to protect American citizens 
and their possession. Such precautions are 
sanctioned by humane considerations and 
by universal precedent concerning a govern- 
ment's duty to protect its unoffending peo- 
ple. But that has nothing whatever to do 
with the President's forbidding Colombia so 
much as to attempt her self-defense. For 
the "fifty-mile order," and for the preventing 
of Colombia from moving her troops which- 
were already within the fifty-mile limit, mo- 
dern history offers no counterpart and in- 
ternational law no sanction. It was sheer 
usurpation! Yet the author of that sheer 
usurpation emphatically avers that so far as 
his acquaintance with diplomacy and inter- 
national law extends, or his education in 
the first principles of national sovereignty 
has advanced, his couse was superlatively 
right. His words are: 

"Not only was the course followed as regards Panama 
right in every detail, but there could have been no varia- 
tion from that course except for the worse. We not only 
did what was technically justificable, but we did what was 
demanded by every ethical consideration, national and 
international." 



46 

He vehemently declares that he did as well 
as he knew how! To believe it would be a 
relief. 

In the final act of the drama, events move 
with accelerated swiftness. As we have seen, 
on November 2, 1903, in time of profound 
peace between Colombia and the United 
States, while there was no slightest interrup- 
tion of transit, the President's amazing 
'"fifty-mile order" was issued. On the even- 
ing of November 3, at six o'clock, de emeute 
which the President had anticipated took 
place in the city of Panama, the chief pro- 
moters being "the fire department." The less 
than two hundred Government soldiers were 
"persuaded" to join the movement. The few 
Government officials were taken prisioners. 
"Four hundred Colombian soldiers landed 
at Colon." This was received in Washing- 
ton at 9.50. P.M. of November 3rd. One 
hour and twenty-eight minutes later — viz., 
at 1 1. 18 — word was returned directing the 
commander of the Nashville to "make every 
effort to prevent Government troops at Co- 
lon from proceeding to Panama." That is, 
in eighty-eight minutes from receipt of not- 
ice of an "uprising" — it was so named in the 
despatch — in the one city of Panama, the 



47 

President transcended his "fifty-mile order" 
of the previous day, and embargoed Colom- 
bia's troops that were already withiin the 
"fifty-mile" limit. The next day, November 
4th, at 9.50 in the morning came the consular 
assurance, "The troops will not be moved. . . 
(Colombian) gunboat Bogota threatens to 
bombard the city to-day" ! At two minutes 
past noon of that same November 4th, a tel- 
egram was sent directing that the Bogota 
cease the "wanton shelling of Panama." It 
was significantly added, "We shall have a 
naval force at Panama in two days." At 
7.10 P.M. of that same November 4th, a 
telegram from the Panama consul an- 
nounced that a proclamation of indepen- 
dence had been issued by the insurgents, and 
that three persons had been deputed to draw 
up a form of government. During the fol- 
lowing day, November 5th, the interchange 
of telegrams respecting the details of the 
situation was frequent and urgent. On No- 
vember 6th, at 12.51, the following Govern- 
ment message was sent to our Panama 
consul : 



"The People of Panama have by an apparently unani- 
mous movement dissolved their connection with the 



Republic of Colombia and resumed their independence. 
When you are satisfied that a de facto government, repu- 
blican in form and without substancial opposition from 
its own people, has been established in the State of Pana- 
ma, you will enter into relations with it as the responsible 
government of the territory/' 

A mere consul authorized to acknowledge 
a new nation, as soon as he thinks that a re- 
publican form of government has been put 
in operation ! And then, "to make assurance 
doubly sure," one hour and fifty-four mi- 
nutes later, at 2.45 P.M., for the consul's 
guidance "in the execution of the instruc- 
tions" just cabled to him, the transmission 
of a copy of a telegram already sent to the 
United States minister ot Bogota: 

'The people of Panama. . . . having adopted a govern- 
ment of their own, republican in form, with which the 
government of the United States of America have entered 
into relations, the President of the United States. . .most 
earnestly commends to the governments of Colombia and 
Panama the peaceful and equitable settlement of all ques- 
tions at issue between them. He holds that he is bound 
not only by the treaty obligations, but by the interest of 
civilization, to see that the peaceable traffic of the world 
across the Isthmus of Panama shall not longer be disturb- 
ed by a constant succession of unnecessary and wasteful 
^ivil wars." 



49 

(We have already traced the record: inter- 
ruption from any and all causes, in the forty 
years of Colombian history, of only one hun- 
dred and sixty-four days). Had the Pres- 
ident wholly forgotten his Latin : Mendacem 
rnemorem esse oportet? 

Thus at 12.51, midday, November 6, 1903, 
the President recognized the new nation, the 
Republic of Panama! From the November 
2nd of the "fifty-mile order," four days! 
From the 7.10 P.M. of November 4th, when 
announcement came that a proclamation of 
independence had been issued by the insur- 
gents, one day, seventeen hour, and forty- 
one minutes ! 

Beyond peradventure, civilized diplomacy 
affords no analogy of that recognition of the 
Republic of Panama. Under a treaty speci- 
fically guaranteeing, as against all foreign 
nations, Colombia's "rights of sovereignty 
and property" over the identical territory in 
question, and also that territory's efficacious 
"neutrality," a treaty whose stipulations 
were to be "religiously observed," the Pres- 
ident of the guaranteeing nation, itself un- 
avoidably included in the treaty's provisions, 
forcibly disabled Colombia from taking the 
slightest precautionary measure against se- 



50 

cession; continued and expanded his hostil- 
ity; and then, in one day, seventeen hours, 
and forty-one minutes from the insuance in 
the one city of Panama of an insurgent pro- 
clamation of independence, recognized a new 
sovereignty ! A popular uprising, at a single 
point, of less than one-tenth of the popula- 
tion of the province of Panama; no revolu- 
tionary committee representing the other 
five districts of the province; no formulated 
statement of grievances; no congress, no 
army, no navy, no courts of justice, no finan- 
cial stability, evidently unable to withstand 
the forces of the parent country; yet an ad- 
mission to the great sisterhood of nations! 
Admitted in less time than measures two 
revolutions of the earth in its axis! It is 
ample cause for thankfulness that the annals 
of civilization are sullied by no sustaining 
precedent. 

In a note of Mr. Seward, Secretary of 
State, to Mr. Adams, American minister at 
the Court of St. James, in 1861, he said: 

"We freely admit that a nation may, and even ought to, 
recognize a new State which has absolutely and beyond 
question effected its independence and permanently estab- 
lished its sovereignity; and that a recognition in such case 



5* 

affords no just cause of offense to the government of the 
country from which the new State has detached itself. On 
the other hand, we insist that a nation that recognizes a 
revolutionary State with, a view to aid its effecting, its 
sovereignty and independence commits a great wrong 
against the nation whose integrity is thus invaded, and 
makes itself responsible for a just and ample redress. . . 
To recognize the independence of a new State, and so 
favor, possibly determine, its admission into the family of 
nations, is the highest possible exercise of sovereign 
power, because it affects in any case the welfare of two 
nations and often the peace of the world. In the European 
system this power is now seldom attemped to be exercised 
without invoking a consultation or congress of nations. 
That system has not been extended to this continent. But 
there is even a greater necessity for prudence in such cases 
in regard to American States than in regard to the nations 
of Europe. . . . Seen in the light of this principle, the 
several nations of the earth constitute one great federal 
republic." 

There spoke the informed conviction of a 
real statesman, and therein appears the im- 
memorial practice of honorable govern- 
ments. 

Suppose that when we were at the thres- 
hold of our last domestic struggle, as soon 
as those disaffected had declared their 
scheme, Great Britain had decided that the 
dismembering purpose was already accom- 



52 

plished; and, when the second twenty-four 
hours was scarce more than half over, had 
accorded the revolted States the full prero- 
gatives of independent sovereignty! Our 
patriotic indignation would have known no 
bounds. Like jealous love, it could not have 
been quenched by many waters nor drowned 
by floods. The flame of our anger would 
have "burned to the lowest hell. ,, Life, for- 
tune, sacred honor would have been freely 
cast into the sacrificial balance. Amazed re- 
sentment, "hors'd upon the slightless couri- 
ers of the air, would have blown the horrid 
deed in every eye!" 

The President naively refers to Panama's 
secession as but a "resuming of her indepen- 
dence." Such is the phrase in his telegram 
of recognition. In his message to Congress, 
of January 4, 1904, he says: 

"A third possibility was that the people of the Isthmus 
who had formerly constituted an independent State, and 
who recently were united to Colombia only by a loose tie 
of federal relationship, might take the protection of their 
own vital interests into their own hands, reassert their 
former rights, and declare their independence on just 
grounds." 

But in no proper sense of the terms was Pa- 
nama ever an "independent State"; nor was 



53 

it by a "recent and loose tie of federal rela- 
tionship" that Panama was united to Colom- 
bia. In 1840 the provinces of Panama and 
Veragua seceded from New Granada; but 
so brief and futile was the separation that 
history simply records the departure and 
return. In 1857 Panama, availing herself of 
a new provision of the central Constitution, 
assumed such quasi-independence as was 
consistent with a federal connection with the 
central Government — precisely that and no 
whit more! Even that quasi-independence 
under a federal relationship lasted only four 
years. In 1863 Colombia became successor 
to New Granada with Panama as an integral 
part of the new Government. From 1886 to 
1903, the province of Panama was as absol- 
utely identified with Colombia as Massachu- 
setts with the United States. Not at all the 
President's loose tie of federal relationship 
of comparatively recent origen, but a scarce- 
ly interrupted integral relationship of almost 
half a century, and a final absolute identity 
of nearly a score of years ! 

To return, the President says : , 

"I have not denied, nor do I wish to deny, either the 
validity or the propriety of the general rule that a new 



54 

State should not be recognized as independent till it has 
shown its ability to maintain its independence. . . . But, 
like the principle from which it is deduced, the rule is 
subject to exceptions; and there are in my opinion, clear 
and important reasons why a departure from it was just- 
fied and even required in the present instance. These 
reasons embrace, first, our treaty rights; second, our 
national interests and safety; and, third, the interests of 
collective civilization." 



Could there be a more decisive disclosure 
of the President's personality and develop- 
ment than his invocation of "exceptions to 
a principle"? Could there be a more signi- 
ficant revelation of his attainments in moral 
science? It had been taken for granted that 
a "principle," whatever a law of nature or a 
standard of conduct, was fundamental, hav- 
ing continuous and uniform force, and that 
exceptions could exist in only the applica- 
tions of the principle. For instance, veracity 
as a principle is "good faith between those 
within the bonds of good faith." In the 
relations of speech to fact there are said to 
be permissible variations. It is affirmed that 
speech need not conform to reality when one 
is conversing with the wholly insane or with 
those whose manifestly malign intent puts 
them beyond the pale of mutual obligation. 



30 



Would the author of Panama policy claim 
for himself not only exceptions in the pract- 
ical modes of veracious speech, but also ex- 
ceptions in the rule itself? In view of the 
President's acts and utterances as related to 
the Panama imbroglio of 1903, one might be 
at least half pardoned for so thinking. The 
clear terms, the indubitable intent, the time- 
honoured interpretation of the treaty of 1846 
he haughtily set aside, substituting therefor 
his egotistic Sic volo, sic jubeo, stet pro 
ratione voluntas — "I took the Canal 
Zone"! 

But there is a second ardent appeal, and 
this time to our own "national interests and 
safety." That also is revelatory of the ap- 
pellant. Was it perceived by others than 
the President, at 12.51 midday of November 
6, 1903, that our national welfare, even to 
the verge of natonal peril, was hinged on 
the immediate construction of an Isthmian 
canal ? According to the statistics of popula- 
tion and pro rata wealth, of production and 
trade, of education and religion, we were 
fairly prosperous and making commendable 
progress. We were at peace with all nations. 
Domestic insurrection was not apprehend. 
It was thought by some that we were al- 



56 

ready in need of the ancient admonition, 
"The pride of thine heart hath deceived thee, 

thou that dwellest in the clefts of the rock, 
that holdest the height of the hill." During 
the years in which the sucessful digging of 
the canal has been going on, has it been 
generally felt that we were trembling in the 
world power-balance, timidly awaiting deli- 
verance? When the canal is finally opened, 
will our national well-being be suddenly and 
completely assured? Yet the self-hypnot- 
ized Executive, who says, "I took the Canal 
Zone," "I am interested in the canal because 

1 started it," asks us to condone his betrayal 
of a trustful ally, on the patriotic ground 
that our own national safety was at stake, 
and that there was no warrant for another 
instant's delay! National well-being is not 
thus secured. He who "has established his 
throne in the heavens and whose kingdom 
ruleth over all" acquits none who work ini- 
quity and are unrepentant. The Persians 
have the proverb, "When even one wronged 
child cries in the dark, the throne of God 
rocks from side to side." 

It remains that we consider the President's 
excuse of "a mandate of collective civiliza- 
tion." Herein the "mandatary" of progres- 



sive humanity rises far above mere patriotic 
zeal? He sees, as through the midsts of apo- 
calyptic vision, an indeterminate and inde- 
terminable something which he calls "col- 
lective civilation." He appears to have been 
in such trance as befell the man of the 
land of Uz : 

"Now a thing was secretly brought to me, 
And mine ear received a whisper thereof; 
Then a spirit passed before my face; 
It stood still, but I could not discern 
The appearance therefore." 

It will ever be regretted that the user of 
the phrase "collective civilization" did not 
attempt to define it. Is it possible that he 
adumbrated the slow accretion of human 
betterments through political and social or- 
ganization; the fair evolutions of art and 
literature; the consummate achievements of 
liberty under law; the infinitely precious 
fruitage of religious aspiration? May he 
have dimly seen the endless procession of 
those who had gone by the crimson path of 
martyrdom to receive earth's undying grat- 
itude and heaven's unending acclaim? May- 
he, by proleptic realization, have felt what 



58 

Wordsworth calls "incommunicable ecsta- 
sies" as he dreamed of the progress yet to 
be made, the felicities yet to ve won? Let 
us endeavour thus to suppose. But even so, 
how could he think that from such high 
source there had come to him alone the man- 
date which conferred autocratic power? In 
what hour of rapt meditation did he hear the 
voice which bade him move unhesitatingly, 
unshrinkingly, to the goal of his desire? In 
connection with what celestial sign did he 
read the words In hoc signo vi rices? "Col- 
lective civilization/' whatever it may mean, 
if issuing any kind of mandates, issues man- 
dates utterly at variance with the self-will 
which "took" the Canal Zone while treaties 
grasped, and diplomacy stood bewildered, 
and international jurisprudence averted her 
astonished sight. It were a moral fatuity, 
on the very face of it, to imagine that the 
greatest good of the greatest number could 
possibly be subserved by flouting good faith 
and reckoning Providence as a co-conspir- 
ator against essential justice. Yet the self- 
appointed protagonist of imperial efficiency 
still declares, 



"We did harm to no one, save as harm is done to a 
bandit by a policeman who deprives him of his chance for 
blackmail." 

The verdict of history reads, "The policeman 
himself under the guise of friendship, he 
smote the innocent and plundered the de- 
fenseless!" 

He who hurried with "Tarquin's ravishing 
strides" to make irrevocable Colombia's dis- 
memberment still argues that his "position 
as the mandatary of civilization" was fully 
recognised by the powers, as witness "the 
promptitude with which, one after another," 
they followed his lead "in recognizing Pa- 
nama as an independent State." Therein he 
ag*ain takes to himself the sole responsibility; 
and therein he is in perfect accord with the 
facts. He adopted the child before it was 
born. He midwifed its birth. He certified, 
for what the certificate was worth, that the 
child was not a bastard. He safeguarded its 
puny, puling infancy. He lifted it, cradle 
and all, to the seat of the mighty. He gained 
for it world-wide recognition. Consequent- 
ly, he might not divest himself of responsibil- 
ity, even though he would ! But the powers, 
in following his lead, did not thereby approve 



6o 



his act. Their course was not only perfunc- 
tory, but also virtually compulsory. They 
could scarcely do aught else than "recognize" 
the new nation on whose political status the 
President of the United States had set his 
official, though tarnished, seal. 

Finally, the restless, strenous "doer of 
things," the seizer of the Canal Zone, asserts 
his worthiness of the unfading laurel. He 
triumphantly declares : 

"The United States has many honorable chapters in its 
history, but no more honorable chapter than that which 
tells of the way in which the right to dig the Panama 
Canal was secured, and of the manner in which the work 
itself has been carried out." 

The raid on defenseless Colombia, in the 
interest of a swift indomitable construction 
of an Isthmian waterway, made to vie with 
the heroic settlement of a new continent, in 
the interest of civil and religious freedom! 
The "fifty-mile order" and its congener of 
the following day, foredooming a "guar- 
anteed" ally to defeat by secession, ranked 
with the proclamation which gave freedom 
to enslaved millions ! The coddled Panama 
"uprising," insured in advance, set in the il- 



6i 

lustrious category of Lexington and Bunker 
Hill, Valley Forge and Yorktownl The re- 
cognition of a new sovereignty, after one 
day, seventeen hours, and forty-one minutes 
of pampered, flimsy, independence, favor- 
ably compared with an independence which 
was won by years of ceaseless conflict and 
the sacrifice of treasures untold! Such a 
treacherous rending of one of their number 
as has awakened dismay and distrust in all 
the Southern republics put on a par with 
that reconstruction of a Northern Union 
which has heartened the friends of demo- 
cracy in all parts of the world ! 

Is it possible that there should be condona- 
tion of the President's "taking" of the Canal 
Zone, because inwoven with the plottings of 
self-centred ambition there was the hasten- 
ing of a national and international good? 
Therein also is there "an exception to the 
principle" that right is right, sacred and 
eternal? Is the end to sanctify the means? 
Then Ahab's rape of Naboth's vineyard was 
well, provided he "took" it for a public park. 
Then the rich man's seizure of the poor 
man's one ewe lamb was fair, if therewith 
he enlarged his feast for the hungry. Then 
Judas Iscariot may be acquited with ap- 



62 

plause, if only he was a thief in order to pay 
his honest debts, and a traitor that he might 
quiet disturbance and strengthen "law and 
order" in the land. 

Here let the chapter of national dishonor 
close its record. Let the final verdict be 
rendered as required by the law and the 
facts. Let the prime actor in that national 
dishonor take his place as determined by 
the same law and those same facts. Fiat 
justitia! 

Meantime, the treatment of Colombia de- 
mands that "just and ample redress" of 
which Mr. Seward spoke. Our national 
honor was dragged in the mire. It ought to 
be rescued from its disgrace. With propriety 
we might repair to the Hague Tribunal, 
humbly bespeaking such penalty as that 
High Court might declare to be right. Until 
reparative action is somehow taken, the nat- 
ional reproach abides. Save as we, national- 
ly, make the amende honorable, "great Nep- 
tune's ocean" will not remove the stain. 
The "damned spot" will still persist. There 
is grim satisfaction in the poet's words : 



63 

"Yea, and though we sinned and our rulers went 

from righteousness; 
Deep in all dishonor though we stained our 

garment's hem; 
Oh, be ye not dismayed, 
Though we stumbled and we strayed; 
We were led by evil counsellors — the Lord shall 

deal with them." 

Yet the satisfaction is mingled with pity 
for those same evil counsellors, as we recall 
the inspired declaration: 

"And in covetousness shall they with feigned words 
make mercandise of you: whose sentence now from of 
old lingereth not, and their destruction slumbereth not/' 



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